We analyze the impact of a rotation system on the effectiveness of monetary policy and the distribution of voting power among the ECB Governing Council members. We apply the models based on either New Keynesian or Neo-Keynesian framework and run simulations to find that volatility of output and inflation declines with a decrease in the home bias of the GC members. It thus strongly suggests that decision-makers should concentrate on the developments in the euro area as a whole and not pursue national interests. Moreover, we show that in most cases there is no significant difference between the two frameworks. We also find that a change in the rotation frequency should not influence the performance of the voting system. Introducing the rotation system significantly improves the economic performance only when Board members focus on the the euro-wide economic developments, whereas NCB governors concentrate on the situation in their country of origin. Strengthening position of the Board is confirmed by the voting power analysis. However, an increase in the Board's power is lower if we allow for the possibility of coalitions among decision-makers, which we identify in the study. We conclude that the reform of the voting modalities in the ECB Governing Council will only partly solve the difficulties that the enlargement process was to impose on the functioning of the old framework.